Analyzing Public Policy by Peter John

Author:Peter John [John, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Public Policy, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781136486418
Google: 81TFBQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 17543689
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1998-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

Table 6.1

Country B

Not clear up Clear up

Country A Not clear up 2, 2 4, 1

Clear up 1, 4 3, 3

Table 6.2

Country B

Not clear up Clear up

Country A Not clear up 2, 2 3, 1

Clear up 1, 3 4, 4

The prisoner's dilemma is an example of the collective action problem, which offers powerful insights for social science; in particular, they question the liberal idea that cooperation naturally follows from mutual interests. Thus in the group accounts of public policy offered in chapter 4, the idea that individuals shape policy on the basis of their resources and effort does not always follow because members of interest groups are not able to rely on the collective action of their members. Such is the central theme of Olson's classic work The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Individuals and groups affected by a policy problem are not able to agree to a solution because they fear other individuals or groups will take advantage of their public concern. The basic message is that no one can take cooperation for granted—and this problem extends across the political system—from right inside bureaucracies to getting the public to help their neighbors. Where participants face a collective action problem, they may not cooperate even though all would gain if they do so.

Collective action problems appear in a host of policy problems, such as the international politics of global warming. Countries do not act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that warm up the planet because they fear other countries will free ride on their goodwill. If some countries undertake expenditure to stop global warming, others can use the situation to improve the competitive advantage of their economies by not taking any measures. The result is that no country acts because each country fears being a sucker. Though the structure of international institutions can overcome this problem through rules of unanimous action, it is also likely that modest solutions to global warming may involve larger countries shifting costs of compliance onto smaller ones (Ward 1996, 2002).

The collective action problem suggests that societies are not able to solve public problems when they involve common pooled resources, what Hardin (1968) calls the tragedy of the commons. Thus in the case of common grazing pastures or fish stocks in the oceans, economic actors overgraze or overfish because they fear others will carry on even if they stop. In policy terms game theory suggests that collective action depends on the nature of the public good. In cases where there are clear benefits in cooperating and the public interest is served, there is little difficulty designing new policies and in ensuring compliance. In other examples there may be great difficulty in achieving policy change. For example, in developing a fishing policy it may be hard to ensure the cooperation of fishing enterprises. In situations where there are clear public benefits, such as air pollution control, it may be easier to ensure compliance. In such cases a rational actor model offers clear explanations why policy making takes a particular outcome in a policy sector.

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